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IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES ON MULTILATERAL RULE
MAKING: THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY AND THE TRIPS
URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS
Mohamed Omar Gad*

I. INTRODUCTION

HE history of the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)' and
the context within which its initiation and progress occurred have
been the subject of numerous legal and non-legal studies. 2 In a significant
number of those accounts, the discourse acknowledges that the rule making process of the TRIPS Agreement and more notably the background
to this rule making process in terms of domestic, unilateral and bilateral
developments in the area of intellectual property (IP) protection has
been disproportionately influenced by the interests of Industrialised
Countries' (ICs) corporate actors. 3 Corporate interests with a stake in a
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Second Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He holds a B.A. in Econom-
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ics from the American University in Cairo. In addition to graduate studies in International Relations at the American University in Cairo, he holds an LL.M. in
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The views expressed herein reflect the personal research findings of the author,
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1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2. See

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE

TRIPS

AGREE-

MENT (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998); DANIEL J. GERVAIS,
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1998); JACQUES J.
GORLIN, AN ANALYSIS 01 THE PHARMACELT-ICAL-RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE
WTO TRIPS (INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY) AGREEMENT (1999); GATT OR WIPO?
NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

(Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989); FROM GATIT ro TRIPS:
THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED

ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RIGHrrs (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).
3. See Susan K. Sell, Multinational Corporationsas Agents of Change: the Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, 169 (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999); Susan K. Sell, The Origins of a
Trade-Based Approach to Intellectual Property Protection - The Role of Industry
Associations, 17 Sci COMM. 163 (1995).
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high level of intellectual property safeguards encompass industries with
considerable investments protected by copyright laws, trademark laws,
and patent laws as well as other forms of intellectual property protection. 4 Among the most prominent industries with investments protected
by patent laws is the dynamic and research intensive pharmaceutical industry. As such, the pharmaceutical industry was and continues to be at
the forefront of corporate lobbying of patent laws.
These lobbying efforts by the pharmaceutical industry and particularly
those of the U.S.-based multinational pharmaceutical giants have significantly affected the course of the multilateral negotiations on intellectual
property; specifically those relating to patents, during the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 19861994. On the other hand, Developing Countries (DCs) resisted the pressure to introduce IP rules, specifically patent rules, within the GATT
framework. However, the ability of DCs to resist the pressure from the
pharmaceutical multinational enterprises (MNEs), as presented through
the medium of ICs' negotiating positions and unilateral and bilateral tactics, was overwhelmed. As a result, the change in the negotiating position
of DCs prior to the official launch of the Uruguay Round compared to
the final result of the negotiations resulting in the TRIPS Agreement is
considerable. In effect, it amounted to a capitulation by DCs to the ICs'
negotiating objectives, which represented pharmaceutical MNEs interests
with regard to the specifics of those patent provisions of relevance to the
multinational pharmaceutical industry.
The focus of analysis in this article is this anomaly in the rule making of
the pharmaceutical-related patent provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
As will be argued below, the problem is in essence one of a 'top-down'
exercise in the rule making of these provisions. While the interests of
pharmaceutical MNEs were largely incorporated into the final text of the
TRIPS Agreement, those of DCs were gradually dismissed over the
course of the negotiations. Such an usurpation of a negotiating position
comes not as a result of a value re-appraisal by DCs, 5 but rather as a
result of this 'top-down' pressure exerted during the rule making process.
Upon reflection the flaws of such an approach are evident and complicate
the implementation process, and consequently, they lead to a profusion
of political and legal disputes on the relevant provisions of the Agreement as evidenced by the access to medicine dilemma on TRIPS. Therefore, the aim of this article is to identify and analyze the causes of this
'top-down' approach to rule making in the context of the pharmaceuticalrelated patent provisions of the TRIPS Uruguay Round negotiations, and
the significant role played by the pharmaceutical MNEs therein.
4. The TRIPS Agreement refers to four more classes of intellectual property rights:
geographical indication, industrial designs, layout designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information.
5. On the contrary, a considerable degree of resistance to the adoption of the standards in the TRIPS pharmaceutical-related patent provisions has been exhibited
by domestic stakeholders in developing countries.
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It should be noted at the outset that the dangers of falling into the trap
of a one-sided dogmatic treatment of the issue and 'caricaturising' events
and positions are considerable. The background of the TRIPS negotiations and the broader process of negotiating other issues within the Uruguay Round are to date perhaps the most comprehensive and complex
undertaking of international economic rule making, spanning nearly a
decade of global multilateral negotiations. In such a framework, the positions of the negotiating parties of the various affected industries and of
industry sub-sectors are multi-faceted. This matrix of interests is similarly
anchored to a canvass of domestic, regional, and global economic and
political conditions that serve only to accentuate their complexity. As a
precaution against these risks, it is important to bear in mind from the
outset the legitimate interests and rights of DCs in their pursuit of patent
regimes and laws that stem from their developmental and public health
policy priorities, as well as the interests of research-based pharmaceutical
MNEs in protecting, recouping, and earning a profit on their R&D investments that amount to the "raison d'etre" of the commercial nature of
their activities.
This article is divided into three sections. Section II examines the position of the pharmaceutical MNEs. It will look at the interests of the pharmaceutical MNEs in terms of their concerns and justifications with the
existing patent regime. It will also consider the specific problems faced by
the pharmaceutical MNEs with regard to the then prevailing standards
and norms of patent protection. Focusing on the United States, Section
III will then examine the process through which the pharmaceutical
MNEs were able to organize and lobby the main ICs to adopt their interests in their quest to address the need to overhaul the international IP
regime. Section III will also examine the bilateral approach adopted by
the United States (particularly the 301 processes), to engage the issue
with recalcitrant DCs in parallel with the TRIPS negotiations. Finally,
section IV presents the synthesis of the analysis carried out in the previous two sections, demonstrating that the TRIPS negotiations were disproportionately influenced by the pharmaceutical MNEs, and ultimately
represented a 'top-down' approach to rule making.
II.

PHARMACEUTICAL MNES PATENT
REGIME PREFERENCES

The pharmaceutical industry is a broad industry that is traditionally divided horizontally into three categories according to the extent of innovation and technology in production. 6 The first category, over the counter
("OTC") drugs, is sold directly to consumers without prescriptions and
contains the least research content. Thus, the main cost outlay in their
6. OECD, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: TRADE RELATED ISSUES 9-10 (1985)

[hereinafter OECD].
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production is marketing costs. 7 The second category is post-patent generic drugs available by prescription, which account for a high percentage
of the pharmaceutical industry in key developing countries.8 Finally, the
third category, in-patent drugs, involves the most outlay of R&D costs
and is almost entirely dominated by the pharmaceutical MNEs. It is the
category primarily responsible for the phenomenal growth of the industry
since the 1930s. 9 This article focuses on the producers of this last group.
With regard to the geographic distribution of the pharmaceutical industry, especially producers of in-patent drugs, there is a wide disparity between the industry portion headquartered in ICs and those based in DCs.
In a report published by the European Commission in 1985 on the eve of
the launch of the Uruguay Round, the following observations on the nature of the industry were made:
The World pharmaceutical market in 1982 was worth U.S. $81,500m.
Most sales were in the developed market economies. The industry is
both research intensive and marketing intensive. There are substantial economies of scale and large companies have a pronounced advantage ....

A limited number of large companies dominate the

world industry. Generally organised on a multinational basis, they
originated in a limited number of developed countries, of which
France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the UK and the U.S.A are the
most important. Production, like consumption, is concentrated in the
advanced nations.10
This article, in its treatment of the interest, concerns and mobilization
efforts of the pharmaceutical industry will focus on large pharmaceutical
MNEs, i.e. those based in ICs. This section engages in a delineation of the
patent regime preferences of the pharmaceutical MNE industry, to be
followed in the next section by an analysis of their mobilization efforts
towards international patent law reform.
A.

JUSTIFICATIONS, INTERESTS, AND CONCERNS OF

PHARMACEUTICAL

MNEs

Pharmaceutical MNEs advocate that a strong patent protection regime
serves not only their interests, but is also beneficial to the global economy
at large, including the economies of DCs who would stand to benefit from
an increase in innovation. This finds resonance in a number of accounts
testifying to the economic utility of adopting a strong patent regime as
7. For a history of the development of the OTC drug market, see MILTON
SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS, ch. 9 (1974).
8. For an account of the generic drug industry, especially as it pertains to developing
countries, see MILTON SILVERMAN,
MEDICINE:

THE PRESCRIPTION

MIA

DRUG

(1992).
9. See OECD, supra note 6, at 10.
10. M.L. BURSTALL & IAN SENIOR, THE
3 (1985).

LYDECKER &

INDUSTRY

PHILIP R.

LEE, BAD

IN THE THIRD WORLD,

ch.

4
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advocated by the pharmaceutical MNEs.II Indeed, two studies published
by the International Finance Corporation in 1994 and 1995 underscored
the importance that the presence of a strong IP protection regime had on
the inflow of FDI into a given country. 12 Of the six industries examined,
this was particularly true in the chemical industry, which includes
pharmaceuticals. 13 Furthermore, pharmaceutical MNEs argue that the
discovery of new drugs is possible due to the protection afforded by patent regimes 14that allow the innovating firms to recoup their R&D
expenditures.
Therefore, the pharmaceutical MNEs justified their position by emphasizing the value of protecting IP as an important contribution to innovation and to the economic progress of all countries including DCs.
Moreover, it was the U.S. pharmaceutical MNEs' success in projecting
their image as a highly productive industry at the forefront of America's
15
international competitiveness that gained firm support for their cause.
The pharmaceutical industry was awarded a highest ranking in terms of
its competitiveness in a survey of thirteen U.S. manufacturing industries
examined in 1992.16 In the most important IC market, this characterization of the pharmaceutical industry proved a strong argument to justify
the protection of IP rights internationally. This was a U.S. industry, globally competitive at a time when the U.S. economy was under severe economic strains during the mid-1980s and facing considerable balance of
payment burdens. Henceforth, the U.S. multinational pharmaceutical industry's emphasis on securing backing of its preferences for a strong international IP regime rested more on brandishing its domestic flagship
industry status as opposed to other industries similarly interested in IP
11. See Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property, Technology and Economic Growth, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 17-30 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole Ganz Brown eds., 1990); see also Richard P. Rozek, Protection of Intellectual

Property Rights: Research and Development Decisions and Economic Growth, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 31-46; R. Michael Gadbaw &
Timothy J. Richards, Introduction, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL

CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICr?
ards eds., 1988).

1-37 (R. Michael Gadbaw and Timothy J. Rich-

12. Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and
Technology Transfer INT'L FIN. CORP. DISCUSSION PAPER No. 19, 1994 [hereinafter
Mansfield]; Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Direct Investment,
and Technology Transfer, INT'L FIN. CORP. DISCUSSION PAPER No. 27, 1995.
13. Mansfield, supra note 12, at 2-3 (Table 1 and 2).

14. Intellectual Property and InternationalIssues: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. oi the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 105-106 (1991) (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, President,
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter Mossinghoff 1991 House
Judiciary Statement].
15. See U.S. InternationalTrade Performance and Outlook: Competitive Position in the
Automotive, Aerospace, and Chemical and PharmaceuticalSectors: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102nd Cong.
502-504 (1992) (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter Mossinghoff 1992 House Statement].
16. Joseph Spiers, Productivity Looks Promising, FORTUNE, Mar. 9, 1992, at 21.
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protection. As Ryan argued, ".... the pharmaceutical interests, unlike the
copyright interests, did not advocate stronger intellectual property laws
based on claims of huge piracy losses in developing countries. Instead
they urged U.S. action based on their opportunities and potential for future foreign investment and sales."1 7 In a report prepared for the U.S.
Senate by the U.S. International Trade Commission in 1991, the protection of IP rights figured as a component of the major factors and determinants in the global competitiveness of the U.S. and other IC
pharmaceutical industries. 18
The pharmaceutical MNEs' interest in a strong IP protection regime
lies in their quest to protect their R&D, thus maintaining their ability to
innovate and provide new drugs to the market.' 9 In terms of time expended in the development of a new drug, the typical R&D outlay is
claimed to be between ten and twelve years, costing onwards of U.S. $350
million.2 0 The pharmaceutical MNE industry's R&D expenditures are
among the highest of industry groups.2 Therefore, a high standards patent protection regime is a high priority for the industry.2 2 Table 1 below
depicts the amount of R&D expenditure on drugs and medicines from
1976 to 1995. Undoubtedly, the numbers represent a considerable resource allocation on the part of the pharmaceutical industry in OECD
countries. While we cannot accurately estimate the amount specifically
contributed by the major pharmaceutical MNEs, they are responsible for
a bulk of the outlay on R&D expenditures in the industry. Indeed, Ryan
claims that ninety-three percent of new drug therapies are introduced by
private enterprises. 2 3 Table 1 also indicates that almost consistently, the
United States spends the most on R&D, closely followed by the EU, with
Japan lagging behind.
17.
18.

MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8 (1998).
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S.
ADVANCED-TECHNOLOGY
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: PHARMACEUTICALS:
REPORT TO THE COMMITrEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, ON INVESTIGATION No.

332-302 UNDER SECTION 332(G) OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930, U.S.ITC Pub. No.

2438 (1991) [hereinafter U.S. ITC 1991 Report].
19. For a discussion of pharmaceutical inventions and innovation, see PHILIP W.
GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY:
FUNDAMENTALS OF GLOBAL LAW, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 210-223 (1999).
20. RYAN, supra note 17, at 29-30.

21.

In the early 1990s, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association claimed that the
average development cost of a new innovative drug was approximately U.S. $231
million. See Hearings on Fast Track: Intellectual Property:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
102nd Cong. 59 (1991) (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter Mossinghoff 1991 Senate Statement].
22. For an analysis of the interests of MNEs in a strong IP regime in TRIPS, using
product-cycle theory and hegemonic stability theory, applied first to Anglo-Ameri-

can experience and then to the experience of Developing Countries, see VanGrass-

tek Communication, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights: United States
Policy, Developing Countriesand the Uruguay Round, in URUGUAY ROUND: FURTHER PAPERS ON SELECTED ISSUES 80-95 (UNCTAD, 1990).
23. RYAN, supra note 17, at 30.
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TABLE 1
R&D EXPENDITURES IN THE AREA OF DRUGS &
MEDICINES FOR MAJOR OECD COUNTRIES AND THE EU
1976-1995 (in millions of PPP dollars at current prices)
1976

1980

1985

1990

1995

U.S.

1091.0

1777.0

3484.5

6287.4

10215.0

EU 2 4

1047.3

1808.0

3166.7

6131.8

7758.1

Japan

377.7

741.6

1568.3

2646.7

3799.9

UK

252.4

495.6

851.7

2003.3

2763.7

France

176.5

322.3

657.7

1062.9

1417.4

Germany

331.0

528.4

687.9

1263.1

1210.4

Italy

879.7

831.1

96.6

387.8

20471.5

28383.4

142.8

237.2

486.7

Canada

19.2

33.9

63.3

TOTAL

3437.9

5944.0

10966.8

1

Source: OECD, Research and Development in Industry: Expenditures and
Researchers,
25
Scientists and Engineers 1976-1997, (Paris: OECD, 1999): various tables.

Given this considerable expenditure on R&D and the importance of
new product development to the multinational pharmaceutical industry,
the protection of IP rights is a major concern for pharmaceutical MNEs.
Numerous studies reported the losses sustained by the major industries,
particularly U.S. industries, due to the lack of effective protection and/or
enforcement of IP rights abroad, especially in the major DCs. 2 6 These
losses were due not only to the unauthorized exploitation of the fruits of
the MNEs' R&D outlays, but also were due to the market losses suffered
by the pharmaceutical MNEs. In 1985, the U.S.-based Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association estimated that in only five countries (Mexico,
Brazil, Argentina, South Korea and Taiwan) its member companies lost
market shares of between thirty and seventy percent on products that
should have been protected but were not.27 Had a patent protection regime similar to those prevalent in ICs and containing the standards advocated by the pharmaceutical MNEs been in place, those member
24.

EU figures represents the total for the fifteen countries currently members of the
EU.
25. Figures for Germany refer to West Germany until 1990 and starting from 1991 the
figure refers to the unified Germany.
26. The most important of such studies coming at the initial phases of the Uruguay
Round negotiations is U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE: REPORT 10 THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
INVESTIGATION No. 332-245, UNDER SECTION 332 (G) OF THE TARIFF ACT OF

1930, U.S.ITC Pub. No. 2065 (1988) [hereinafter U.S. ITC 1988 Report]; See also
U.S. ITC 1991 Report, supra note 18; STEPHANIE EPSTEIN & JAMES MATTHEW
JONES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT A CROSSROADS:
TERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 15-24 (1990).

GLOBAL PIRACY AND

IN-

27. Foreign Trade Practices (Part 2): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, and the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 196
(1985) (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufactur-

ers Association) [hereinafter Mossinghoff 1985 House Statement].
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companies would have enjoyed market exclusivity for their patented
products for the duration of the patent term. This problem was compounded by the fact that by the early 1990s forty percent of total sales of
the U.S. pharmaceutical MNEs were international sales. 2 8 Finally, the
vulnerability of the pharmaceutical industry to piracy was underlined by
the fact that the duplication of chemical compounds is a relatively
straightforward task, as opposed to researching and developing it, which
29
entailed considerable expenses.
B.

IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
PATENT PROTECTION

From the perspective of ICs' business interests, particularly from that
of the pharmaceutical multinational enterprises, the problem issues in IP
protection were those of regime deficiencies and general enforcement inadequacies in the protection of intellectual property. 30 This was true
both at the domestic (DC) and international (WIPO) levels. While
MNEs were generally well coordinated and had similar concerns about
the deficiencies in the IP regimes of DCs as well as those in the international regime, there were some important differences. Such differences
mainly concerned the importance attached to any particular type of intellectual property, whether pertaining to copyright, trademarks, or patents. 31 Notwithstanding these differences, certain classes of problems
such as enforcement and dispute settlement were crosscutting issues of
interest affecting the entire industry spectrum. This facilitated the emergence of common stances on the IP issue in addition to the important
specific concerns carried forth by specialized industry lobbying groups
32
within the IP industry lobbying armada.
Before addressing the problem issues, another vital factor to bear in
mind in characterising the IP problem, as argued by MNEs, ICs, and particularly the United States, has been its strategic redefinition as a 'trade'
28. Mossinghoff 1991 Senate Statement, supra note 21, at 59.
29. E'STEIN & JONES, supra note 26, at 16-17.
30. U.S. ITC 1988 REPORT, supra note 26, at 1-6.. An excellent review of the com-

plaints of the ICs about inadequate protection of intellectual property is Frank
Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round - Negotiating Strategiesof the
Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'l L. 1317, 1319-1344 (1990).

31. For the perspectives of the electronics, pharmaceutical, recording, communications
and chemical industries respectively on the international protection of intellectual
property rights, see INTELi-ECTUAL PROPERTY RIGH-TS AND CAPITAL FORMATION
IN THE NEXT DECADE 119-159 (Charles E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield eds.,

1988).
32. Two particularly powerful groups were the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), leading the efforts focusing on copyright, and the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (PMA) leading the efforts focusing on patents as they
affected the pharmaceutical industry. These groups were both U.S.-based. A larger
industry-wide group was the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), also U.S.based and led, which played a major role in organising non-U.S. based industry in
lobbying the GAIT intellectual property negotiations.
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problem in the first instance. 33 As their preferred strategy opted for a
transfer of the IP agenda from WIPO to the trade-based GATT regime,
MNEs sought to dress the problem in the "trade gown."' 34 In a landmark
document in international business' (including the pharmaceutical
MNEs) lobbying campaign of the TRIPS negotiations that was issued trilaterally by the Intellectual Property Committee of the United States,
35
Keidanren of Japan, and the European UNICE in the summer of 1988,
the problem was defined as follows: "[i]nadequate and ineffective protection of intellectual property against infringements of intellectual property
rights has substantially distorted international trade. If adequately and
effectively protected, intellectual property promotes the expansion
of in36
technology.
of
transfers
and
investment
trade,
ternational
Furthermore, in lobbying the U.S. Congress before the Uruguay
Round negotiations and throughout the course of the negotiations, business interests and especially the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association sought to define and frame their testimonies during congressional
hearings on trade-related issues. 37 Moreover, business interests lobbied
for the introduction of IP infringement in the USTR's annual report to
Congress entitled "National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers. '"38 The characterization of the issue as a trade problem has
therefore shifted the focus from that of DCs choosing their own IP protection regime according to their public policy priorities, to an issue of
trade distortion and export losses. Commenting on the problem in DCs,
the president of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association stated:
"[a]ll have significant deficiencies in intellectual property protection for
pharmaceuticals, the correction of which would substantially improve the
market share for U.S. pharmaceutical companies. '39 Furthermore, in a
33. In 1987, the Vice President of IBM argued "that intellectual property has become
a trade problem is not surprising, because the source of the problem is the same as
that of other trade issues. That is, nations often put domestic priorities first and
only later understand that national actions favoring them can seriously erode their
own international trade interests." Kenneth W. Dam, The Growing Importance of
International Protection of Intellectual Property, 21 INT'L L. 627, 630 (1987).
34. See Possible New Round of Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.

on Finance, 99th Cong. 144, 149-152 (1986) (statement of Kenneth W. Dam, Vice
President, Law and External Relations, IBM Corp., on behalf of the Intellectual
Property Committee) [hereinafter Dam 1986 Senate Statement].
35.

KEIZAI DANTAI RENGOKAI, UNICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMirEE, BASIC FRAMEWORK OF GATT PROVISIONS ON INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY: STATEMENT OF VIEWS OF THE EUROPEAN, JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES BUSINESS

COMMUNITIES (1988) [hereinafter Trilateral Report].
36. Id. at 11.
37. See Mossinghoff 1985 House Statement, supra note 27; Unfair Foreign Trade Practices: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong. (1989) (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter Mossinghoff 1989 House Energy and Commerce Statement].
38. This annual report was first presented to the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Committee on Ways and Means in 1985. Its statutory basis lies in section
303 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
39. Mossinghoff 1985 House Statement, supra note 27, at 194.
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testimony to Congress the Intellectual Property Committee argued that:
First, intellectual property is important to international competitiveness. And second, inadequate international protection of intellectual
property has become a major cause of distortions in the international
trading system. Under these circumstances, the IPC believes that it is
both appropriate and necessary for intellectual property issues to be
dealt with under international trade rules as a supplement to existing
40
international intellectual property conventions and agreements.
Three major problem areas have been pinpointed by MNEs: (1)
problems of deficiency in DCs intellectual property regimes pertaining to
standards and norms of protection; (2) problems associated with a lack of
or ineffectiveness in enforcement, and the lack of a credible dispute resolution mechanism;- and (3) problems of deficiencies in the standards codified in international intellectual property protection regimes, most
importantly the Paris Convention. 4 1 The focus here will be on the inadequacy pertaining to standards and norms of patent protection.
In a survey of U.S. companies conducted by the United States International Trade Commission, 42 eight specific problems were identified in the
patent regimes of 54 countries comprising:
* no patent protection
" patentability precluded by statute
" term too short
" early lapse
" compulsory licensing
" Paris Convention nonadherence
* patent claims are narrowed too much
" unrealistic working requirements
Not surprisingly, the patent laws of the major DCs suffered from most,
if not all, of the eight inadequacies reported by U.S. firms.4 3 It is important here to briefly refer to the main problems perceived by the pharmaceutical MNEs. 44 Pharmaceutical MNEs focused their complaints on five
almost identical problems to the eight identified above. 45 First was the
problem associated with the absence of any patent regime in certain
countries. This, however, was a problem affecting a limited number of
countries. 46 Second, there was the more widespread practice of excluding
40. Dam 1986 Senate Statement, supra note 34, at 146.
41. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 21 U.N.T.S. 305, Mar.
20, 1883 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
42. U.S. ITC 1988 REPORT, supra note 26, at 3-5 - 3-6.
43. By far the worst offenders under these criteria, as identified by the firms surveyed,
were Brazil and India each figuring in seven out of eight of the individual complaints; See also U.S. ITC 1988 REPORT, supra note 26, at Table 3-1.
44. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based PharmaceuticalCompanies: The Need
for Improved Patent Protection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TECH. 307 (1987).
45. As outlined in Peter C. Richardson, The Need for Adequate and Effective Protection of Intellectual Property: Perspectives of the PrivateSector - Patents, 19 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMp. L. 352, 353-54 (1989); Peter C. Richardson was then Assistant General Counsel, and General Patent Counsel of Pfizer Inc.
46. In 1989 Indonesia and Turkey were perhaps the only major examples. Id. at 353.
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certain classes of subject matter from patentability with pharmaceuticals
figuring prominently in such statutory exclusions. For example, Brazil excluded pharmaceutical products and processes from patentability, 47 warranting its "anti-pharmaceutical patent policy" as described by the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association to be "the most egregious". 48
Third and more widespread still, was the practice of affording pharmaceutical process protection while excluding the final products from pat49
entability. Argentina, Egypt and India are examples of this practice.
The fourth complaint of the pharmaceutical MNEs was what they perceived as inadequacy in the term of protection. 50 This was particularly a
problem given the pharmaceutical MNEs claim that bringing a new product to the market can take upwards of twelve years, and hence if the term
of protection falls short of that there is effectively no protection.
Finally, the fifth complaint concerning DCs' compulsory licensing and
related lapse provisions pertains primarily to the working requirements
on patent holders. Pharmaceutical MNEs have two main contentions with
these provisions. 51 The limited period of time within which working of
the patent should occur (three years as authorised by the Paris Convention) is incongruent with the much lengthier period of time required by
the MNEs to bring their products to the market, estimated at ten years
from patent grant. The second argument was that economic realities militate against having production facilities in every single jurisdiction where
patent protection is sought. Thus, it would be far more economically efficient for some markets to be supplied through imports. Once the problem
issues had been identified, the pharmaceutical MNEs had the considerable task of resolving them in favor of their interests.
III.

MOBILISING FOR INTERNATIONAL PATENT
LAW REFORM

Multinational Enterprises, including U.S. MNEs that maintain a significant stake in intellectual property protection, sought to overhaul the international IP regime to protect their interests globally, and particularly
in key DCs, after having identified specific problem issues. A main avenue to accomplish this goal was through procuring the assistance of the
key players in the global economy, particularly the United States, to en47. Decree No. 5.772, Dec. 21, 1971, art. 9(c).
48. USTR Identification of Priority Practices and Countries Under Super 301 and Special 301 Provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st
Cong. 134 (1989) (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter Mossinghoff 1989 House Ways and
Means Statement]. For PMA complaints against the patent regimes of Brazil, India and Argentina. See id. at 134-36.
49. For Argentina, see Law No. 111, Oct. 11, 1864, art. 4; for Egypt, see Law No. 132 of
1949, art. 2; and for India, see Indian Patents Act No. 39, Sept. 19, 1970, § 5.
50. As an example, India provides a patent term of only five years for pharmaceutical
processes; See Indian patents Act No. 39, Sept. 19, 1970, § 53(1)(a).
51. Richardson, supra note 45, at 354-55.
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gage bilaterally the major DCs accused of violating their intellectual
property rights. Second, the MNEs sought to initiate a multilateral undertaking on the subject that would guarantee them a single governing global
standard for all countries.
A.

THE BILATERAL APPROACH: LOBBYING THE KEY PLAYERS

We hope the imposition of this sanction, which is modest in comparison to the revenue losses sustained by our industry in Brazil, will impress upon Brazil the seriousness with which the United States views
the unauthorized appropriationof its citizens' intellectual property.
52
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association
In pursuit of their aims for international patent law reform, pharmaceutical MNEs, as well as MNEs in general, realized early on in the quest
for a strong patent regime that the involvement of the U.S. administration and Congress as allies was essential to their efforts. 53 Not only was
the United States a strategic market for the vast majority of its trading
partners and one they could not afford to forego, but equally, the United
States was also a leader in international economic diplomacy whose domestic economic legislation had a worldwide impact. A logical first step
for the concerned business sectors was to fine-tune the U.S. legislative
and policy process to conform to their objectives and then to deploy this
arsenal of laws "as instruments of commercial warfare. '54 Below, an
overview of the most relevant U.S. legislation in this regard is presented,
followed by an analysis of how the U.S. pharmaceutical lobby and specifically the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, potently deployed
this arsenal against two key DCs, Brazil and Argentina. Finally, while the
United States' bilateral approach on IP matters was by far the most significant during and throughout the Uruguay Round negotiations, a brief
analysis EC's role is also discussed below.
Through a series of amendments particularly in 1988, U.S. trade legislation integrated the protection of IP rights. Perceived unjustified acts by
foreign trading partners constituted violations, which required the U.S.
Trade Representative to intervene to protect the intellectual property of
its citizenry. The most famous of these legislative instruments were Section 337,55 Section 301,56 "Special 301" 57 and "Super 301".58 While the
first instrument was designed to protect U.S. IP owners from violations in
import trade, the three latter instruments were designed to induce change
52. See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association Statement, 2 WIPR (BNA), 220
(1988).
53. RYAN, supra note 17, at 67.
54. Robert C. Cassidy, National Trade Policy Instruments and the GATT: A U.S. Lawyer's Perspective, CONFLIcr AND RESOLU'riON IN U.S.-EC TRADE RELATIONS 159

55.
56.
57.
58.

(Seymour J. Rubin and Mark L. Jones eds., 1989); see also SELL (1995), supra note
3.
Tariff Act of 1930 § 337, amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2003).
Trade Act of 1974 § 301, amended by 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2003).
19 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2212(b)(2) (2003).
19 U.S.C. § 2420 (2003).
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partners using access to the highly
in the IP regimes of America's trading
59
leverage.
as
market
U.S.
coveted
Section 337 was designed to protect U.S. producers from:
.. unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which
is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and
commerce in the United States .... 60
"Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts," included violation of
U.S.-owned IP rights. 6 1 While a previous amendment to Section 337
served to depoliticize the process by transferring the authority to issue
orders excluding the importation of foreign goods violating U.S. IP rights
from the President to the International Trade Commission 62 and thus
shielding U.S. business from the 'whims' of the diplomatic prerogatives of
the President. The MNE lobby, however, was not entirely satisfied with
the process. Primarily, complainants had to show that the "unfair method
of competition" or the "unfair acts" had the effect of destroying or substantially injuring the industry. 63 They also had to prove that they were
an "efficiently and economically operated" industry "in the United
States." 64 Due to these burdensome conditions, U.S. IP owners seeking
to exclude imports of goods infringing their IP rights lobbied for an
amendment. The amendment to Section 337 occurred as part of the 1988
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. 65 The amended Section 337
eliminated the injury requirement in those investigations related to statutory IP rights (i.e., patents, copyrights, trademark, and mask works)
where it declared 'unlawful' "[t]he importation into the United States, the
sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that - (i) infringe a
valid and enforceable United States patent .... ",66
Hence, this facilitated complainant's argument limiting it to a showing
of statutory IP infringement only. The 1988 amendment deleted the re59. However, the initial impetus for integrating intellectual property concerns into legislation primarily dealing with trade, was initially apparent in the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act and in the Generalized System of Preferences Renewal
Act; See Mossinghoff 1985 House Statement, supra note 27, at 194.
60. Tariff Act of 1990 § 337(a), amended by Trade Act of 1974 § 341, Pub. L. No. 93618 (1975).
61. Between the years 1974 and 1986 more than ninety percent of Section 337 investigations initiated by the ITC were IP related. See GAO study quoted in, A.S. Newman, The Amendments to Section 337: Increased Protection for Intellectual
Property Rights, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT', Bus. 571, n. 9 (1989).

62. 1975 amendment in subsection (a), Pub. L. No. 93-618 substituted "Commission"
for "President." See Sell, supra note 3, at 166.
63. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2003).

64. Id.
65. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 (1988).
66. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2003).
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quirement that the industry be "efficiently and economically" operated,
and it simplified the other requirement that it be a domestic industry (reference to the old text of an industry "in the United States"). In the latter
case, the amendment refers to the Commission as granting relief "only if
an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the
patent, copyright, trademark, mask work or design concerned, exists or is
in the process of being established. '67 In the following paragraph, an "industry in the United States" shall be considered to exist if there is: (A)
significant investment in plant and equipment; (B) significant employment of labour or capital; or (C) substantial investment in its exploitation
[of the IP protected article], including engineering, research and develop68
ment, or licensing.
While U.S. MNEs were able to protect their domestic market from import competition quite effectively after the amendments to Section 337,
the lack of what they deemed adequate IP protection in overseas markets
continued to create major problems for them. A different set of trade
legislation was required to combat 'lax' IP protection in foreign markets.
This need was fulfilled through Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as
amended. This instrument was designed to protect the United States
from certain "unfair trade practices" by its trading partners. It did so
initially by requiring the Trade Representative to "take all other appropriate and feasible action within the power of the President '69 to enforce
the right of the United States under any trade agreement, or to respond
to any act, policy or practice of a foreign country that "is inconsistent
with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States
under, any trade agreement" 70 or "is unjustifiable AND burdens or restricts
United States commerce."'7 1 In this regard, "unjustifiable" was defined to
include, inter alia, "any act, policy, or practice. . .which denies... protection of intellectual property rights."'72 Furthermore, "unreasonable" was also defined to include, inter alia, any act, policy, or practice
that denies the "provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.

.

.

. "73

The "appropriate and feasible action"

within the power of the President, to take in case of a violation under
section 301, included the suspension or withdrawal of concessions in a
trade agreement with the country in violation under section 301, or the
imposition of duties and other such restrictions, or fees and restrictions
on the imports or services of such a country respectively.7 4
It was not until the 1988 amendments to section 301, however, that the
USTR was obligated to take action with regard to a 301 complaint, thus
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 1337(a)(2) (2003).
§ 1337(a)(3) (2003).
§ 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2003).
§ 2411(a)(1)(B)(i) (2003).
§ 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2003) (emphasis added).
§ 2411(d)(4)(B) (2003).
§ 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(1) (2003).
§ 2411(c)(1) (2003).
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no longer retaining discretion in deciding whether to initiate action. New
powers were also introduced in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, where under "special 301", the USTR was required to identify countries which deny "adequate and effective" protection of IP rights
to American firms and to investigate their practices. 75 Furthermore, according to the new "super 301," the USTR was required to identify "priority foreign countries" and to self-initiate section 301 investigations of
the practices of these so-designated countries. 7 6 Such identification was
based on the USTR's annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
77
Trade Barriers.
Mainly through the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association Section 301 was put to effective use by the U.S. Pharmaceutical MNEs as
part of their strategy to induce and coerce change in the patent regimes of
certain strategic markets in DCs. 78 Indeed, as Ryan argues, "[s]pecial 301
intellectual property policy has similarly been used for the benefit of
some of the most globally competitive American industry sectors pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals, films and music recordings, computer software - and these industry groups have shaped the USTR's di'79
plomacy agenda for protecting intellectual property."
Section 301 investigations cover a number of very interesting landmark
cases relating to the U.S. bilateral approach to international IP protection. 80 Nonetheless, the most interesting and relevant from the perspec-

tive of pharmaceutical MNEs were two cases initiated by the USTR in
75. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2212(b)(2) (2003).
76. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a) (2003).
77. This Report, required by statute under Section 303 of the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984, identifies and analyzes acts, policies or practices that constitute significant
barriers to or distortions of U.S. exports of goods and services, property protected
by trademarks, patents and copyrights exported or licensed by U.S. citizens, and
U.S. direct investment overseas.
78. See Susan Sell, Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing
World: Crisis, Coercion, and Choice, 49 INT'L ORG. 315, 323-30 (1995). Sell argues

that:
In all eight cases [301 IP cases], the targeted governments agreed to improve
intellectual property protection along the lines desired by the United States.
Furthermore, the timing of the changes demonstrates the strong link between this exercise of U.S. leverage and the changes in targeted states. In
short, both the substance and the timing of these policies can be explained as
a product of coercion.
Id. at 323.
79. RYAN, supra note 17, at 85.

80. See most notably one of the first and standard setting of the cases of the use of
section 301 in IP violations, USTR, Korea: Initiation of Investigation Under Secion
302; Adequacy of Korean Laws for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights,
Nov. 4, 1985, USTR Pub. Docket No. 301-52, 50 Fed. Reg. at 45,883 (1985). For
commentary on the Korean 301 investigation, see J.H. Bello & A.F. Holmer, Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases, 21 INT'L LAW.
211, 221-23 (1987); A.Y. Park, InternationalTrade: Agreement Between the United
States and the Republic of Korea ConcerningInsurance Market Access and Intellectual PropertyProtectionin the Republic of Korea, July 21, 1986, 28 HARVARD INT'L
L.J. 166 (1987). See also 2 WIPR (BNA) 131 (1988).
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response to petitions filed by PMA against Brazil in 198781 and against
Argentina in 1988.82
In its petition against Brazil, PMA specifically targeted the denial of
patent protection for pharmaceutical products and the processes for preparing those products. 83 The result of this denial, PMA argued, adversely
affected its member companies in four ways: injury to their patent rights,
injury to their investments in Brazil, injury to their exports from the
United States and other nations to Brazil, and lost opportunities that
84
would otherwise exist for further investment and trade with Brazil.
PMA estimated the losses of its member companies at U.S. $160 million
between 1979 and 1986 and projected losses under the status quo until
the year 2000 amounting to U.S. $280 million. 85 Counsel for PMA argued
that such action from Brazil burdened and restricted U.S. commerce. An
accompanying legal memorandum stated that "the 1984 amendments to
the Trade Act enable the Petitioner to satisfy the unreasonable requirement of Section 301 of the Trade Act, as amended, by showing that the
Brazilian system unfairly denies adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights with respect to pharmaceutical products. '86 On
the importance of the petition from the U.S. industry perspective, PMA
argued:
[t]his Petition deals directly with the capacity of United States industry to compete on a fair basis in an important market for American
products. The issues raised by this Petition cannot be answered by
referring to the needs of governments to develop their economy or
meet the material needs of their people. Thoughtful leaders and
scholars in developing nations recognize that these nations will benefit more from respect for the intellectual property rights87 of others
than from contributing to the weakening of those rights.
On the other hand, while Argentina provided patent protection for
pharmaceutical processes, it did not provide protection to pharmaceutical
products. 88 As such, PMA's petition against Argentina was primarily
81. Unfair Trade Practices; Brazil Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals; Initiation of
an Investigation, 52 Fed. Reg. 28,223 (July 28, 1987).
82. Initiation of Section 301 Investigation; Argentina's Failure To Provide Adequate
and Effective Intellectual Property Protection for Pharmaceuticals, 53 Fed. Reg.
37,668 (Sept. 27, 1988).
83. Petition filed by P. Trooboff, Covington & Burling, on behalf of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association, in Brazil - Pharmaceutical Patents, USTR Public
Docket No. 301-61, [hereinafter PMA Brazil Petition]. The specific object of the
complaint is article 9(c) of the Brazilian Patent Law, which excludes, inter alia,
pharmaceutical products and the processes for their production from patentability.
84. PMA Brazil Petition, supra note 83, at 2.
85. Id. at Appendix E "Lost Sales by U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry Resulting from
Brazilian Failure to Provide Patent Protection."
86. Id. at 12.
87. Id. at 21-22. Almost identical language appears in Petition filed by P. Trooboff,
Covington & Burling, on behalf of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association, in Argentina - Pharmaceutical Patents, USTR Public Docket No. 301-68. See
PMA Brazil Petition, supra note 83, at 34-35.
88. Law No. 111 art. 4 [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 434, (Oct. 11, 1864).
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based on the absence of product protection - an absence it notes was
sufficient for a section 301 determination of unfairness in the earlier Brazil case. 8 9 Moreover, PMA advanced four additional causes of complaint
inherent in the Argentine patent law. Primarily, PMA's petition noted
that patent protection for pharmaceutical processes under Argentine law
was inadequate and ineffective and therefore a totally unsatisfactory substitute for product protection. 90 This result was due largely to the ineffectiveness of process protection in the pharmaceutical industry, because the
end product could be developed with easily changeable processes. Second, 'innovators' bore the burden of proving that the defendant infringed
their pharmaceutical process patent as opposed to the defendant proving
he did not. Thirdly, the enforcement of patent rights suffers from weaknesses in the remedial provisions and enforcement of the patent law because there is no injunctive relief, and a financial penalty estimated when
the law was enacted in 1864 has become severely devalued. 9 1 Finally,
article 47 of the patent law provides for the lapse of all patents if they are
not worked in Argentina within two years from the year of grant, which is
a provision in violation of article 5 of the Paris Convention that mandates
92
the passage of a minimum period of three years.
Compared to the Brazil case, the estimated economic losses suffered by
PMA member companies seemed to be much more severe-with sales
losses of up to U.S. $526 million between 1980 and 1987, and estimated
losses reaching over U.S. $1 billion from 1987 to 2000. 93 Given these
losses, PMA sought four main remedies: the introduction of product patent protection for pharmaceutical products, the protection of trade
secrets, amendment of the lapse provision of article 47 of the Argentine
patent law, and most interestingly, market exclusivity rights for "pipeline" products that are currently subject to patent protection in countries
other than Argentina. 94 This latter remedy was a precursor for the discussion of exclusive marketing rights during the negotiations on TRIPS.
While reflecting bilateral concerns of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
in important markets such as Brazil and Argentina, the Brazil and Argentina petitions were filed with a broader purpose in mind. As an engagement of leading DCs (particularly of Brazil) antagonistic to the
regulatory position of the pharmaceutical MNEs for stronger patent protection worldwide, these two cases served to underscore the resolve of
the pharmaceutical MNEs. In the words of PMA President Gerald
Mossinghoff:
89.
90.
91.
92.

PMA Argentina Petition, supra note 83, at 16-17.
PMA Argentina Petition, supra note 83, at 20.
Law No. 111 art. 53, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 435 (Oct. 11, 1864).
Id. at 434; Multilateral Protection of Industrial Property, art. 5, 21 U.S.T. 1583,
1592 (July 14, 1967).
93. PMA Argentina Petition, supra note 87, at Appendix G "Lost Sales by U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry Resulting from Argentine Failure to Provide Patent
Protection."
94. Id. at 32.
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Brazil is a leader of the so-called G-77 countries' effort to reduce the
already minimum standards for patent protection in the Paris Convention. It has also opposed efforts to include intellectual property
protection within the purview of the GATT as a trade-related issue.
As a newly industrialised nation, it is time for Brazil, the eighth largest economy in the west,
to start playing by the rules of the interna95
tional trading system.
The pressure created by PMA in launching the Brazil section 301 case,
however, went beyond any of the other IP-related section 301 cases because it led to the first imposition of retaliatory measures. On July 21,
1988, the U.S. President determined that "Brazil's failure to provide process and product patent protection for pharmaceutical products is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce," and directed the USTR
to hold hearings on imposing "increased duties or other import restrictions" on some Brazilian products from a list of products accounting for
U.S. $200 million in trade. 96 On October 20, 1988, the U.S. President issued proclamation 5885, which increased U.S. import duties by 100 percent ad valorem on articles imported and produced in Brazil to the value
of U.S. $40 million. 97 This action was terminated on July 2, 1990 pursuant
to the Brazilian government's announcement of its decision to seek legislation to provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products and
processes. 98 By contrast, the Argentine investigation was terminated
upon the withdrawal by PMA of its petition on September 23, 1989 that
cited progress in bilateral consultations between the governments of the
United States and Argentina.9 9
The United States clearly had a powerful statutory arsenal to tackle the
issue of international IP protection. Put to effective use by the U.S. international business sector, this arsenal was notoriously unilateralist, coercive, and in certain aspects, GAIT-illegal. The European Communities
submitted a GATT complaint against Section 337. Subsequently, the
GAT panel found it to be inconsistent with article 111(4), where it accorded procedural treatment less favorable to imported products allegedly infringing U.S. intellectual property as compared to products of U.S.
origin. 10 0 Furthermore, Brazil also lodged a GATT complaint against
U.S. section 301, but withdrew the complaint following a mutual under95. Statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President, PMA, in Brazil - Pharmaceutical
Patents, USTR Public Docket No. 301-61. PMA Brazil Petition, supra note 83.

96. Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,177 (July 27,
1988). Transcripts of the hearings, which took place on September 8, 1988, over
two sessions, are available with the author and can be accessed from USTR Public
Docket No. 301-61.
97. Proclamation No. 5885, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,551 (Oct 20, 1988).
98. Determination to Terminate Increased Duties on Certain Articles from Brazil, 55
Fed. Reg. 27,324 (July 2, 1990).

99. Letter from Gerald Mossinghoff, President, PMA, to A. Jane Bradley, Chairman,
Section 301 Committee, USTR, in Argentina - Pharmaceutical Patents, USTR
Public Docket No. 301-68, supra note 87.
100. See Lyn M. Schlitt, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Under Section 337 of
the Tariff Act: Addressing the GATT Panel Report, 510 PLI/CoMM. 103 (1989).
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standing. As a leading commentator argued in the late 1980s on the state
of 301 action:
No doubt exists, however, that this program meets with a high degree of foreign resistance, risks significant damage to United States
foreign policy interests, and is terribly inefficient. Moreover, gains
achieved by United States negotiators are passed on at no cost to its
major trade competitors in the European Communities and Japan,
thus strengthening the argument for a multilateral approach. 10 1
In contrast to the United States, the European Community and its
member states lagged behind in terms of the priority they accorded to the
protection of IP rights. This was particularly the case with patents, as the
EC was a net importer of patents vis-A-vis trademarks and copyrights of
which it was a net exporter. 10 2 The EC was reluctant to link the IP issue
to trade and introduce it as an issue in the forthcoming round of GATT
negotiations, where initially, the EC adopted an approach very close to
the DCs' position. Only gradually did the EC warm to the U.S. approach
of the inclusion of an agreement on IP.103 In the EC's policy document
for the new round of negotiations, the Council of Minister's "Overall Approach," the EC not only separated the treatment of counterfeit goods
from that on IP, but more importantly, presented a weak statement on its
objectives, stating:
International trade increasingly depends upon an appropriate protection of intellectual property rights,.. Such protection should guarantee an adequate return on investment devoted to developing new
goods and services... while at the same time avoiding unreasonable
barriers to trade. The New Round could contribute to the definition
of a better balance between these often conflicting objectives, having
due regard to ongoing work in other organisations such as WIPO. As
a first step, a review of those GATT provisions that already deal with
intellectual property, including
in particular Articles XX and IX,
10 4
should be undertaken.
The EC had no forceful agenda for international IP protection, seeking
neither at the bilateral nor at the multilateral level. In addition, the degree of business influence on EC policymaking was more limited compared to that enjoyed by business over the U.S. policymaking process.105
101. Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual
Property Negotiations in the GATT MultilateralFramework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L

L. 689, 711-12 (1989).

102. Mogens Peter Carl, Intellectual Property Rights in the Uruguay Round: the EC
Viewpoint, in CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION IN U.S.-EC TRADE RELATIONS 249-50
(Seymour J. Rubin & Mark L. Jones eds., 1989).
103. For a concise commentary on the initial EC position on IP, see HUGO PAEMEN &
ALEXANDRA BENSCH, FROM THE GATT TO THE WTO: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE URUGUAY ROUND 84-85 (1995).
104. Overall Approach: New Round of Trade Negotiations in Defence of Open Multilateral Trade, EEC Doc. No. 7748/86, SEC (86) 840 final.
105. See Marco Bronckers, National Trade Policy Instruments and the GATT: An EC
Lawyer's Perspective, in CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION IN U.S.-EC TRADE RELA-

TIONS 146 (Seymour J. Rubin & Mark L. Jones eds., 1989).
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This leads us to the importance attached by the MNEs to a multilateral
approach to IP protection where they sought an international lobbying
campaign in favor of introducing high standards on patent protection into
the new GAIT round of negotiations.
B.

THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH: PHARMACEUTICAL
THE TRIPS PATENT NEGOTIATIONS

MNEs

AND

What is new in this case is that industry identified a trade problem,
devised a solution, and reduced it to a concrete proposal that it then
advanced to governments. These private sector actors succeeded in getting most of what they wanted from an
IP agreement, which now has
10 6
the status of public internationallaw.
The pharmaceutical MNEs, as other international business interests,
eventually realized that reliance on the bilateral approach was an unsustainable strategy. Not only were certain bilateral tactics GATT-illegal,
but they were also subject to the political priorities of the government
deploying them and thus unreliable in the long term. More importantly,
reliance on an international regulatory framework requiring signatory
parties to adhere to the standards enshrined therein guaranteed IP owners a durable and legitimate, if indirect, mechanism of protection. This
was even more highly coveted if this framework comprised standards
conforming to their preferences with an effective enforcement and dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, a multilateral approach was preferred, and GATT as a venue was ideal in this regard. However, this did
not entail forfeiture of the bilateral approach, which was still advocated
by a leading MNE executive as necessary to secure agreement within
GATT. Therefore, bilateral pressure was a tactic to achieve the multilat10 7
eral GAIT strategy.
U.S. MNEs began a campaign to launch multilateral trade negotiations
within the GATT ambit on IP, aiming to produce a multilateral code that
included the "adoption and implementation of adequate and effective
rules for the protection of intellectual property."'1 08 Two U.S. business
mobilization efforts were crucial in this regard-the Advisory Committee
for Trade Negotiations (ACTN) and the Intellectual Property Committee
(IPC). Established by statute in 1974 to provide the U.S. President with
advice on trade negotiations, the ACTN was a committee of leading executive officers from major U.S. corporations with a stake in U.S. and international trade policy. 10 9 On the issue of IP protection and the quest of
the U.S. business community to include the issue within the GATT ambit
by including it in the upcoming new round of multilateral trade negotiations, the ACTN issued in October 1985 an outline of a multilateral IP
agreement to be concluded within GATT and supplied it to the U.S. ad106. Sell, supra note 3, at 171.
107. Dam, supra note 33, at 636-37.
108. Trilateral Report, supra note 35, at 17.

109. See 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (2001).
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ministration." 0 This was followed by a report issued by the ACTN Task
the adminForce on Intellectual Property,"II which ultimately influenced
2
istration's statement on the protection of U.S. IP abroad."1
In addition to the ACTN effort, one of the leading U.S. corporate officers, Pfizer's CEO Edmund Pratt (who also served as Chair of ACTN)
together with the CEO of IBM, decided in March 1986 to establish the
IPC as a coalition of senior executive officers from twelve major U.S.
corporations in diverse areas of activity with a 4 common interest in IP
protection. 1 3 The objectives of the IPC were:"
" the inclusion and successful negotiation of a satisfactory arrangement for IP (patents, copyrights, trade secrets and trademarks) in
the new round of GATT trade negotiations...
" the development of a coherent international strategy, including bilateral negotiations, in support of IP protection...
* cooperation between the U.S. private sector and the international
business community in support of improved international IP
protection...
" changes in various U.S. trade laws to improve IP protection.
Therefore, in its quest for the successful negotiation of a GAIT-based
IP protection regime, the IPC sought to secure an international consensus
between business interests not only in the United States but also in Europe via UNICE and Japan via Keidanren."1 5 In this regard, the IPC had
a number of MNEs in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries with a
high stake in ensuring a strong patent protection regime for future multilateral negotiations on the issue, including Bristol-Meyers, Merck, Pfizer,
Du Pont and Monsanto. Pfizer took the lead in this group-particularly
in lobbying the U.S. Congress. Similarly, Pfizer engaged the TRIPS
negotiators on the ground in Geneva where it hired a number of Geneva110. U.S.

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROP., SUMMARY
OF PHASE I: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TO THE ADVISORY COMMITEE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1985). See also

Jacques J. Gorlin, The Business Community and the Uruguay Round, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE

170-72

(Charles E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1988); and Sell, supra note 3, at
178-83.

111. U.S.
112.

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RiGHTs, SUMMARY OF PHASE IL
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE (1986).
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ADMINISTRATION STATEMENT ON THE PROTECTION OF U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ABROAD (1986), reproduced as an attach-

ment to Intellectual Property Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade
of the Senate Comm. on Fin., 99th Cong. 96-100 (1986) (statement of Harvey E.
Bale, Assistant USTR).
113. See Dam 1986 Senate Statement, supra note 34, at 146. See also Carol Bilzi, Towards an Intellectual Property Agreement in the GATT: View of the Private Sector,
19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343, 343-45 (1989); Sell, supra note 3, at 183-86.
114. Dam 1986 Senate Statement, supra note 34, at 149.
115. The fruits of this cooperation was the issuance of the Trilateral Report, referred to
earlier, and arguably the single most important contribution of international business to the Uruguay Round negotiations.
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1 16
based lobbyists for that purpose.
Despite Pfizer's active role within the IPC, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) and its associated lobbying of the U.S. administration and Congress was the spearhead of the pharmaceutical
MNEs' mobilization campaign to defining, fine-tuning, and pursuing their
goals of international protection of IP rights. 11 7 As examined above,
PMA was also active in petitioning for the initiation of 301 investigations.
Resulting in a considerable advantage in its access to policy-makers and
expertise in the IP area, PMA was presided over by none other than Gerald J. Mossinghoff, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents. Obviously, PMA realized that the involvement
of the U.S. administration and Congress in its' endeavour was crucial to
the success of its efforts. Apart from the exertions of ACTN on the administration and its direct impact on the U.S. position on international IP
protection as well as the work of the IPC in lobbying the administration
and in framing the U.S. negotiating objectives through Congress, 118 PMA
was undoubtedly the principal mobilization vehicle of U.S. pharmaceutical MNEs in lobbying the U.S. Congress. A direct method for performing this task was through testimony concerning the negotiations, U.S.
national interests in the new round of multilateral trade negotiations, and
its follow-up during Congressional hearings that ran during the TRIPS
negotiations." 9 This effort maintained pressure on the U.S. legislature
and the presidential administration through constantly voicing MNEs
concerns on IP. Pressure was also maintained through PMA's evaluation
of the final TRIPS Agreement itself during congressional hearings on the
20
results of the Uruguay Round.

116. Interview with Gerald J. Mossinghoff, former President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 29, 2002).
117. During the period from 1985 and until the end of the Uruguay Round and beyond,
PMA representatives regularly appeared before Congress as witnesses for hearings
on issues related to IP protection.
118.

Dam 1986 Senate Statement, supra note 34. See also GATT: The Impact on American Industries: Hearing and Mark-up on H.R. 362 Before the Subcomm. on Econ.
Policy, Trade and Env't of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Cong. 44-79

(1994) (statement of Jacques Gorlin, Intellectual Property Committee).
119. See Mossinghoff 1991 Senate Statement, supra note 21, at 56-63; Mossinghoff 1991
House Judiciary Statement, supra note 14, at 99-118; Trade and Tech.: Implications
of the GATT Negotiations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech. and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 102nd Cong. 68-

81, 91-102 (1991) (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter Mossinghoff 1991 House Science Statement]; Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. 69-74

(1993) (statement of Harvey E. Bale, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association)
[hereinafter Bale 1993 House Statement].
120.

See Trade Agreements Resulting from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means and its Sub-

comm. on Trade, 103rd Cong. 559-568 (1994) (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff,
President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association). See also Trade Agreements
Resulting from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means and its Subcomm. on Trade, 103rd

Cong. 134-149 (1994) (statement of Timothy Hackman, Intellectual Property Com-
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As referred to earlier, the IPC played a prominent and active role in
engaging international business interests headquartered outside the
United States, focusing its efforts mainly in Europe and Japan. Furthermore, in July 1986 the International Chamber of Commerce endorsed a
similar approach favored by U.S. MNEs on IP protection for the Uruguay
Round. 2 1 As to the specifics of the pharmaceutical MNEs' forward international deployment, an important role was performed by the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations
(IFPMA). 122 IFPMA was important to the pharmaceutical MNEs' lobbying strategy at the international level for two main reasons. Primarily, it
was a venue where discussion and 'agreement' on specific courses of action could swiftly be dispensed across the world given its international
membership, coupled with the fact that IFPMA was largely influenced by
the U.S. PMA. In the words of Gerald Mossinghoff: "PMA had a lot to
do with IFPMA policies."'1 23 Second, and most conveniently, IFPMA
was headquartered in Geneva and only a stone's throw from where the
TRIPS negotiations were being held in GATT. Thus, it was able to follow up on developments and provide feedback as well as engage the
negotiators personally. IFPMA's then Executive Vice-President, Richard
Arnold, was praised by PMA President as having proved a consistent and
124
resourceful lobbyist and a great help for the pharmaceutical industry.
Finally, mention should also be made of the work undertaken by the International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property
(IAPIP).' 25 A private association aiming towards the protection of industrial property. IAPIP was the oldest of the organizations reviewed
possessing a tradition stretching as far back as the 1890s.126 Among the
key questions IAPIP members reviewed and issued resolutions on were
those on "GATT/WTO" and on "Enforcement of Intellectual Property
12 7
Rights."

121.

mittee); Jobs Through Anti-Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Policy,
Trade and Env't of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Cong. 75-81 (1994)
(statement of Peter C. Richardson, Pfizer, Inc.).
See extracts of ICC statements on the TRIPS negotiations and Agreement, in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND TRIPS AGREEMENT

128-

35 (1996).

122. See

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS AsSOCIATIONS, GATT TRIPs AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A REVIEW

(1995).
123. Interview with Gerald J. Mossinghoff, supra note 116.
124. Id.
125. See Joan Clark, The Role of GATTITRIPS, of WIPO and of AIPPI in the further
Development of Intellectual Property Right Protection, in INT'L ASSOC. OF TI-E
PROTECTION OF INDUS. PROP.,

AIPPI

AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL

PROPERTY PROTECTION 1897-997, 481-88 (Simone Amberg & Ruth Vogt eds.,
1997).
126. Id.
127. See INTL Assoc. OF THE PROTECTION OF INDUS. PROP., AIPPI CHtRONICLE AND
RESOLUTIONS, Questions 94, 134, 134A, 134B (Martin J. Lutz ed., 1999).
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So far, we have examined the mechanism of action that the MNEs and
particularly the pharmaceutical MNEs undertook to push for their international IP protection objectives at the multilateral level. These mechanisms were naturally used to push for the norms they wished to
incorporate into a new regime for IP protection. With regard to the form
within which these norms were to be incorporated, the IPC sought their
inclusion within the GATT. The argument they presented was that IP
was, after all, not a new issue to the GAIT being that its articles XX(d),
IX, XII, XVIII, and III, are of relevance to patents, trademarks, or copyrights. 128 Furthermore, given that the root cause of the problem being
dealt with was the "trade-related" aspects of IP rights, it was clearly
within the scope of GATT. The IPC advocated a dual pronged approach
within GATT: primarily, finalising negotiations over the anti-counterfeiting code for trademarks, and second, introducing IP provisions that
would focus on patent and copyright infringement and "could seek to
develop and enforce substantive norms and standards... and... agreed
rules of behaviour, . . dispute settlement procedures and authority to impose trade restriction on countries that tolerate violation of intellectual
property rights."'1 29 Two years later however, with the GATT mandate
on IP firmly in place and negotiations underway, the IPC changed its preferred approach and opted for a GATT "agreement" rather than an anti130
counterfeit code and amendment of GATT articles.
The Trilateral Report issued by the IPC, Keidanren, and UNICE detailed the standards and norms championed by MNEs for adoption into
an agreement. In the words of Pfizer's Vice President and General Counsel, it was the "standard reference" for the GATT IP negotiations regarding the views of the private sector.' 3 ' The provisions advocated by the
Trilateral Report on the standards for patent protection are presented in
1 32
Table 2 below, where they are compared to the submissions of the EC,
the United States, 133 and Japan. 134 Most importantly, those standards advocated the patentability of both products and processes without discrimination as to subject matter and a patent term of twenty years from
128. Dam 1986 Senate Statement, supra note 34, at 152, 165.
129. Id. at 153.
130. Trilateral Report, supra note 35, at 18-19. Interestingly, this was also the approach

advocated by the U.S. delegation in the first meeting of the negotiating group on
intellectual property (Negotiating Group 11).
131.

Oversight of the Trade Act of 1988: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Fin. (Part

2 of 3), 101st Cong. 34 (1989) (statement of C.L. Clemente, Vice President and
General Counsel, Pfizer Inc., on behalf of the Intellectual Property Committee).
132. GAIT, Guidelines and Objectives Proposed by the European Community for the
Negotiations on Trade Related Aspects of Substantive Standards of Intellectual
Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG1l/W/26 (Jul. 7, 1988) [hereinafter Second EC

Submission].
133. GAIT, Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotiating Objective -

Revision, MTN.GNG/NGll/W/14/Rev.1 (Oct. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Revised U.S.
Submission].
134. GATT, Submission by Japan - Addendum, MTN.GNG/NG11W/17/Add.1 (Sept.

23, 1988) [hereinafter Revised Japanese Submission].
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filing. 13 5 On the issue of working and compulsory licensing, the Report
required that there be no revocation on grounds of non-working and that
a compulsory license awarded for non-working shall be granted only to
permit local manufacture. Where impractical, importation authorized by
the patentee shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements for working.
Finally, neither exclusive nor sole compulsory licenses shall be granted,
nor shall compulsory licensing provisions discriminate against particular
classes of subject matter-an important requirement for the pharmaceutibeing granted, full comcal industry. In the case of a compulsory license
136
patentee.
the
to
due
be
should
pensation
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF PATENT STANDARDS ADVOCATED IN 1988
SUBMISSIONS OF THE EC, JAPAN, U.S. AND THE
TRILATERAL REPORT (IPC - KEIDANREN - UNICE)
IPC - Keidanren
- UNICE
Submission
13 7
(June 1988)
Rights Conferred:

135.

Exclude others
from the right to
exclude others
from the manufacture. use or sale
of the patented
invention and. in
the case of a patented process, the
ability to exclude
others from the
use or sale of the
direct product
thereof,

Second EC
Submission
(July 1988)138

Revised Japanese
Submission 1 3 9
(September 1988)

Revised U.S.
Submission
(October 1988)140

Prevent third parties not having the
proprietors consent from making,
offering, putting
on the market or
using... or importing or stocking
the product for
these purposes.
For processes. the
right to prevent
others not having
proprietor's consent from using.
offering, putting
on the market,
using, or importing or stocking for
these purposes the
product obtained
directly by that
process.

Prevent third parties
not having owner's
consent from:
In case of a product
- manufacturing,
using, assigning, leasing or importing the
product, and acts of
displaying, for the
purpose of assignment or lease, the
product:
in case of a process acts of using the process:
in case of a process
for the manufacture
of a product - using
the process, using,
assigning, leasing or
importing the product directly. manufactured by the
process. displaying.
for the purpose of
assignment or lease.
the product directly
manufactured by the
process.

Exclude others
from the manufacture, use or sale.
In the case of a
process, the right
to exclude others
from importation.
use or sale of at
least the direct
product thereof.

Trilateral Report, supra note 35, at 32.

136. Id. at 32-33.
137.

Trilateral Report, supra note 35.

138. Second EC Submission, supra note 132.
139. Revised Japanese Submission, supra note 134.
140.

Revised U.S. Submission, supra note 133.
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Exceptions to
Rights
Conferred

No reference.

Private acts, noncommercial
purposes and
experimental use.

No reference.

No reference.

Criteria for
Patentability

New. industrially
applicable and
unobvious devices,
products and
processes without
discrimination as
to subject matter,

Products or
processes.
Industrial
application, new,
and involve an
inventive step.

Inventions of
products or
processes.
Industrially
applicable, novel,
and involve an
inventive step.

All products and
processes that are
new, useful14and
1
unobvious.

Exceptions to
Patentability

No reference.

Contrary to
42
"ordre public"'
or morality. Plant
or animal varieties
or essentially
biological
processes for the
production of
plants or animals,
excluding
microbiological
processes.

Inventions contrary
to public order,
morality or public
health, and of
inventions of
substances
manufactured
through nuclear
transformation.

No reference.

Patent Term

20 years from
filing.

20 years from
filing,

20 years from filing.

20 years from
filing.

Compulsory
Licenses

Granted on
grounds of nonworking only to
permit local
manufacture,
When justified
factors make it
impractical to
carry out the
invention locally,
importation
authorised by
patentee should
be deemed to
satisfy local
working. No
exclusivity. No
discrimination
against particular
classes of subject
matter. Full
compensation to
patentee.

Subject to review
by a court of law,
where granting is
sought on grounds
of insufficiency of
exploitation, for
dependent
patents, official
licenses, or use in
the public interest,

Subject to judicial
review where
granting is sought on
grounds of failure to
work or insufficient
working, or in
respect of dependent
patents. or in the
public interest,

Subject to judicial
review and nonexclusive. Solely to
address, only
during its
existence, a
declared national
emergency, or to
remedy an
adjudicated
violation of
antitrust laws. May
also be used nonexclusively by a
government for
governmental
purposes.

Possibility of
Patent
Forfeiture/
Revocation

No revocation on
grounds of nonworking.

No reference.

Forfeiture subject to
judicial review,

No revocation on
grounds of nonworking.

The congruence between the provisions advocated by the business
community and those advanced by the main IC delegations during the
negotiations on TRIPS was indicative of the influence MNEs had on forging the IC positions. Regardless, towards the latter stages of the negotiations the pharmaceutical MNEs began to voice discontent with certain
141. The U.S. paper notes that the terms "useful" and "unobvious" encompass or are
synonymous with the terms "capable of industrial application" and "inventive

step." Revised U.S. Submission, supra note 133 at 3.
142. This was the first reference to the ordre public exception of the eventual TRIPS
Article 27(2).
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aspects of the unfolding instrument. This mainly centered on what they
considered to be overly long transition provisions for DCs and the lack of
'pipeline' protection. 14 3 Nonetheless, the multilateral strategy of the
MNEs was by all counts successful in launching the TRIPS negotiations
towards the realization of their interests.
IV.

TRIPS PATENT NEGOTIATIONS: AN EXERCISE IN TOPDOWN RULE MAKING?

The evidence presented thus far in this article reveals that the TRIPS
negotiations, specifically as they pertained to patent standards, were the
product of a process that was disproportionately influenced by the interests of pharmaceutical MNEs at the expense of DC interests, resulting in
a 'top-down' model of rule making. This section will first deal with the
factors that led to this format in the TRIPS rule making process,. Second,
the section will briefly highlight this case with insights on the process of
international regulation, particularly with regard to the role of non-state
actors therein. Finally, this article will end with brief comments on the
implications of the TRIPS negotiation phase to the main argument of the
volume on the issue of fairness in GATT/WTO rule making.

A.

PHARMACEUTICAL

MNEs

AND THE

TRIPS

PATENT

NEGOTIATIONS OUTCOME

The role of the pharmaceutical lobby, particularly the U.S. pharmaceutical lobby represented by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
and more generally by the IPC, has undoubtedly been a major catalyst, if
not the raison d'6tre, for the drive towards the relevant standards on patent protection in the TRIPS Agreement. The reason for this success by
the pharmaceutical MNEs in this rule making exercise was due to four
key factors.
The first two factors relate respectively to the cohesion and organizational prowess of the pharmaceutical MNE lobby. Arguably, the nature
of the 'piracy' problem faced by the pharmaceutical giants was peculiar in
eliciting a high level of cohesion within their rank, as it posed a common
problem faced by most of them especially in the larger DC markets. This
facilitated the emergence of a strong cohesive stance revealed in the formation of the IPC, which involved a number of pharmaceutical MNE
members, as well as a clear stance by the PMA on the issue. It was further reinforced by international solidarity primarily through the IPCUNICE-Keidanren unified position,'144 and second, through the efforts of
143. Hearings on Fast Track: Intellectual Property: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd
Cong. 172 (1991) (statement of C.L. Clemente, Vice President and General Counsel, Pfizer Inc.). In addition, Susan Sell notes complaints by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry with regard to the compulsory licensing provisions. See Sell, supra

note 3, at 185.
144. This led to the publication of the Trilateral Report.
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the international federation, IFPMA. Related to the factor of cohesion in
the success of the pharmaceutical MNE efforts is their organizational
prowess. Not only were these MNEs financially well resourced, but they
were equally successful in having exceptional human resources to bear on
the issue. The experience and networks of such key figures as Edmund
Pratt, 145 Gerald Mossinghoff,1 46 and Richard Arnold, 147 among others,
were major contributing factors in this regard. 148 Furthermore, the coordination of work by the pharmaceutical lobby in 'working' Capitol Hill
and the Administration, and in information gathering and direct lobbying
of delegates in Geneva, as largely conducted by IFPMA, was also an organizational ability, unmatched by the majority of DC delegations.
Also related to the MNEs organizational abilities, the third factor was
their success in defining the problem, in devising a solution, and ultimately in supplying it in a legal format. Earlier, the 'genius' of framing
the IP problem in a trade context was discussed. Furthermore, the utility
of providing a proposed draft document very close to treaty language in
the form of the Trilateral Report at the early stages of the negotiations
proved an effective tool in gaining momentum. Finally, the fourth factor
relates to the ability of the MNEs to effectively lobby the dominant state
actor(s) during the Uruguay Round negotiations and particularly on the
TRIPS patent standards provisions. This will be further alluded to below
as an important element of influence by non-state actors in international
rule making.
B.

NON-STATE AcTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RULE MAKING

The involvement of transnationalcorporationsand producer associations, and their interaction with governments in making of the TRIPS
Agreement, demonstrates that an elite of powerful actors has
joined
the nation state in the management of the global economy.149
The practice of rule making at the international level has been an important area in international legal study, in international relations theory,
and in regulation theory. Under established international legal practice,
rule making and the process of treaty making as pursued during the Uruguay Round, follows the precepts enshrined in the 1969 Vienna Convention. 150 Article 2(1)(a) of the Convention defines a "treaty" as "an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and
145. Edmund Pratt is former CEO of Pfizer and convenor/founder of the IPC.
146. Gerald Mossinghoff was President of PMA during the Uruguay Round and former
U.S. Under-Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents.
147. Richard Arnold was Executive Vice-President of IFPMA during the Uruguay
Round.
148. Braithwaite and Drahos enumerate 'individuals' as important actors involved in
international economic regulation. For their analysis, see JOHN BRAITHRWAITE &
149.

PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 494-97 (2000).
GAIL E. EVANS, LAWMAKING UNDER THE TRADE CONSTITUTION:
LEGISLATING BY THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 119 (2000).

150.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." 15 ' As far as the issue of identifying the actors involved in the
52
treaty making process, the Convention ascribes standing only to states.
Despite this fact of international legal discourse ascribing capacity only
to 'states' in engaging in the rule making effort, the examination thus far
in this study has focused on the inordinate degree of influence exerted by
the pharmaceutical MNEs in these negotiations. While neither the MNEs
nor their associations participated formally in the negotiations, their influence was clearly felt. Ascribing the representation of the MNE interests to the formal representation of their home-states has been
established under the doctrines of 'diplomatic protection' and 'state
53
responsibility.1
However, other strands of theoretical analysis have sought to account
for the increasingly important role of MNE influence as of other nonstate actors in international rule making. Primarily from international legal theory, these include the vision of the 'process-oriented approach,'
chief among which are the writings of the New Haven School that recognizes that participants in the international legal process are defined not
by their possession of the attribute of 'sovereignty,' but rather by their
possession of the attribute of 'effective authority' and/or 'effective control'. 54 Second, international relations theory offers a tradition of placing non-state actors and domestic influences as major contributing factors
to international negotiations. 1 55 In this regard, the work of Robert PutArticle 2(1)(a) of the 1986 Vienna Convention offers the same definition with the
added provision of international organisations as possible parties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations, 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986).
152. See Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Actors and Factorsin the Evolution of Treaty Norms: An
Empirical Study, 4 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 1 (1999).
153. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
See also Fleur Johns, The Invisibility of the TransnationalCorporation:An Analysis
of International Law and Legal Theory, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 893, 894-96 (1994);
PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 503-14 (re151.

vised ed., 1999).
154. The process-oriented approach to law found its most forceful proponents in the
New Haven School, founded by Professors Myres S. McDougal and Harold Lasswell at the Yale Law School. It must be noted, however, that a process-oriented
approach to law is by no means the invention of the New Haven School. Rather it

is rooted in the Sociological Movement, which found earlier expressions, most notably in Legal Realism. See ALAN HUNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN LAW
(1978). For a recent review of the approach, see ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS
AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE I (1994); see also HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY, VOLUME 1 (1992); Myres S.

McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82
Recueil des Cours 137 (1953).
155. See TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Robert 0. Keohane &
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 1971). See also RICHARD W. MANSBACH ET AL., THE WEB
OF WORLD PoLITIcs: NONSTATE ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM (1976). For a
more recent account and slightly altered work in this tradition, see BRINGING
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTrrUTIONS (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995).
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nam on negotiation as a two-level game (including the domestic level) is
particularly relevant. 56 Finally, regulation theory offers important insights on the ability of a regulatory activity or undertaking to be initiated
and controlled by certain private interests. 157 Most importantly in this
regard is 'public choice' theory, which posits that regulation, rather than
being initiated originally in the pursuit of public interest, in fact originates
in the self-interested pursuits of business for governmental intervention
158
on behalf of their interests.
C.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE

TRIPS

PATENTS NEGOTIATIONS

As becomes evident from the examination above, DCs and the pharmaceutical MNEs approached the issue of patent protection from different perspectives. As their interests were at odds, the discourse employed
by each party in the debate to justify their positions was different. While
this article warned earlier of the dangers of falling into the trap of an
ideologically grounded debate on the relevant merits of either party's position and their approach to the issue, it is important to note the diametrically opposed nature of some of their justifications. MNEs argued that
existing international IP regimes, most notably the Paris Convention,
were never intended to address trade-related distortions, and hence the
existence of a problem in international economic regulation was required
to be addressed in a new fashion. 159 On the other hand and diametrically
opposed to this contention, was the argument by DCs, as expressed by
India's submission to the negotiating group on TRIPS. Their argument
was that the philosophy behind regimes for the protection of IP was to
encourage and promote public policy priorities, and that the trade-related
problems associated with it were the quest of IP owners to distort such a
160
goal to fulfill their narrower interests.
Supported by other IC delegations (particularly the EC) during the
Uruguay Round negotiations, the role performed by the United States
also contributed to this 'top-down' rule making process. Apart from the
bilateral diplomatic pressures and unilateral sanctions applied mainly by
156. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988).
157. See ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., A READER ON REGULATION (1998). See also ROBERT BALDWIN &
MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING
REGULATION: THEORY,
158.

STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE (1999); CHRISTOPHER HOOD, EXPLAINING ECONOMIC
POLICY REVERSALS (1994).
This approach is developed in: MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); George J. Stigler, The The-

ory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971); Richard A. Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335 (1974). See also Paul B.
Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International
Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745 (1995).
159. See Trilateral Report, supra note 35, at 15.
160. See GATE, Standards and Principles Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use
of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights - Communication from India,
MTN.GNG/NGl1/W/37 (Jul. 10, 1989). See also GATT, Meeting of Negotiating
Group of 12-14 July 1989,. MTN.GNG/NG11/14 (Sept. 12, 1989).
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the United States,16 1 the said delegations were also engaged in manipulative negotiating tactics with DC delegations partly through their ability to
offer concessions to DC delegations in other areas of the Uruguay Round
negotiations such as in textiles. However, they were also able to exclude
DC delegations from key decision making, notoriously in the 'green
room' process of negotiations among the like-minded ICs with the results
offered on a take it or leave it basis for DCs.
Two further factors contributed to this characterization of a 'top-down'
rule making process. Primarily, the forum of the GATT was amenable to
the interests of ICs. The GATT/WTO system and particularly its rule
making process in the form of rounds of negotiations to be carried forward as a single undertaking with the end product in the form of a package, lends itself to those negotiating delegations with the most bargaining
power. Particularly, the ability of the United States and EC to offer DC
delegations concessions in important areas was paralleled by their ability
to force a capitulation on the part of DC delegations on the issue of
TRIPS. Finally, the lack of cohesion among DC delegations on the issue
of TRIPS, as in other issues during the Uruguay Round, facilitated this
162
process and made them an easier target of IC pressure.
The fait accompli resulting in the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement at
the end of the Uruguay Round was by no means the end of the line with
regard to the pharmaceutical patent dilemma. Its implementation and
the complications leading to the Doha Declaration and the subsequent
negotiations on implementing paragraph 6 of that Declaration, proved
beyond doubt that the debate on the relative 'fairness' of the TRIPS
Agreement has not been settled. 163 This complicates its implementation
and leads to a profusion of legal and political disputes that are proving
detrimental not only to TRIPS and the WTO regime, but also to the interests of all parties involved-including DCs and MNEs.

161. For an attack by certain delegations during the negotiations, on the Special 301
process, as being a violation of the commitments under the Punta del Este Declaration, specifically with regard to standstill and rollback, see GATT, MTN.GNG/
TRIPS/i (Jul. 25, 1991), at paras. 4-5.

162. On the breaking up of 'third world unity' during the Uruguay Round, see
CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THE URUGUAY ROUND
AND TH

THIRD WORLD 75-77 (1990).

163. This point is also addressed by Susan Sell. She argues that, while DCs might have
changed the black letter law of their IP regimes, action on its own will not guarantee their conviction of its merits. See SUSAN SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTHSOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST

(1998).
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